An Entropy Analysis based Intrusion Detection System for Controller Area
  Network in Vehicles by Wang, Qian et al.
An Entropy Analysis based Intrusion Detection 
System for Controller Area Network in Vehicles
Qian Wang*, Zhaojun Lu †, and Gang Qu *  
* Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Maryland, College Park, United States 
† School of Optical and Electronic Information, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, China 
E-mail: {qwang126, gangqu}@umd.edu {D201377521 }@hust.edu.cn
Abstract—Dozens of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) can be 
found on modern vehicles for safety and driving assistance.  
These ECUs also introduce new security vulnerabilities as recent 
attacks have been reported by plugging the in-vehicle system or 
through wireless access. In this paper, we focus on the security of 
the Controller Area Network (CAN), which is a standard for 
communication among ECUs. CAN bus by design does not have 
sufficient security features to protect it from insider or outsider 
attacks. Intrusion detection system (IDS) is one of the most 
effective ways to enhance vehicle security on the insecure CAN 
bus protocol. We propose a new IDS based on the entropy of the 
identifier bits in CAN messages. The key observation is that all 
the known CAN message injection attacks need to alter the CAN 
ID bits and analyzing the entropy of such bits can be an effective 
way to detect those attacks. We collected real CAN messages 
from a vehicle (2016 Ford Fusion) and performed simulated 
message injection attacks. The experimental results showed that 
our entropy based IDS can successfully detect all the injection 
attacks without disrupting the communication on CAN.  
I. INTRODUCTION  
In the past decade, more and more advanced functions and 
features have been added to modern vehicles which make 
them not only safer but also connected, smarter, and more 
intelligent. To support these growing functions and features, a 
large amount of software and hardware electronic equipment is 
integrated into the car system. For example, with the recent 
aggressive push of autonomous vehicles, many Electronic 
Control Units (ECUs) are introduced for data processing and 
communications between inside the vehicle network and the 
Vehicle Ad-hoc Network (VANET) [1]. Moreover, the 
applications of the vehicle network make the vehicle as a 
connected device to the Internet of Things (IoT), not just a 
traditional physical part. As vehicles adopt more connectivity 
functions to the external network, security threats on electronic 
controllers of vehicles are highly rising. With safety remains 
as the most important concern for automakers, security is now 
gaining lots of attention because a compromised ECU or faked 
communication messages can cause fatal failures just like 
mechanical problems. It has been shown that attacks can be 
successfully launched on cars to cause severe impacts on the 
normal driving behaviors [2], [3]. When the in-vehicle 
communication network was designed in the late 1980s, there 
were only about 1% electronic equipment in the vehicle 
system. Thus the original design requirements of such network 
at that time were merely to connect the limited in-vehicle 
ECUs. A simple message broadcasting based communication 
protocol, known as the Controller Area Network (CAN), was 
used for this purpose without any consideration of security. 
Not surprisingly, due to its lack of security concerns and 
protection, CAN’s vulnerabilities are exposed to the attackers 
and become a major target for a variety of threat models. The 
successful attacks demonstrate that without the intrusion 
detection or authentication methods, it becomes very 
challenging for the CAN-based communication network to 
defend emerging attacks such as message replays, injections, 
and modification [4], [5]. Nevertheless, the important role that 
CAN plays in the communication of vehicular systems has 
made it an irreplaceable component and thus the research 
community has continued its efforts in seeking secure and 
efficient protection method for the CAN network.  
Generally speaking, there are two kinds of 
countermeasures to defend against attacks on CAN bus: 
message authentication and intrusion detection. Message 
authentication code (MAC) has been successfully used in other 
security applications, but it is highly restricted by the nature of 
CAN that was not designed for security. For example, the data 
length of the regular CAN message is only 8 bytes which 
limits the space for appending a message authentication code. 
Researchers have demonstrated that several MAC-based 
security schemes could provide protections to the CAN bus 
[6], [7]. However, these schemes have limited flexibility in 
adapting to new applications and incur high cost in the MAC 
deployment. Furthermore, inline security protection methods 
like message authentication often complicate the 
communication and result in significantly increased overhead 
in performance such as the response delay. The real-time 
requirements on the vehicle system for time-critical 
applications such as braking system would pose a high 
demand on the processing time to compute, append, and verify 
the MACs.  
Because of the limitation of MAC, Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS) has become a better choice. The IDS will work 
as monitoring the contents and the periodicity of in-vehicle 
CAN message and verify whether there are any significant 
changes. In [8], the authors proposed an entropy-based 
anomaly detection method for in-vehicle networks. They 
consider the scenario that an attacker injects messages with all 
0’s (which dominant other messages in CAN bus arbitration) 
into CAN bus. Computing message entropy can effectively 
detect such attacks. However, they fail to consider other 
complex attack scenarios. For example, the attacker might 
inject some purposely generated non-all-0 high priority 
messages to obtain control of the CAN bus. Among the other 
anomaly-based IDS methods, the clock-based IDS uses the 
clock skew to fingerprint the ECUs [9]. However, this method 
would need off-line computations to extract the fingerprint for 
each ECU which is difficult to meet the requirement for real-
time detection.  
In this paper, we focus on building a more effective 
method to detect a variety of injection attacks on CAN bus. 
The main idea is based on the observation that in the CAN 
message arbitration protocol, 0 dominates 1, which means that 
message with bit 0 will win the CAN bus over message with 
bit 1. Therefore, any injected messages, seeking to block other 
messages from accessing the CAN bus, would change the 
entropy at the bit level. By studying which bit’s entropy 
changes, we develop a fast and efficient algorithm to search 
for the malicious ID as well. Further, the malicious messages 
containing those IDs would be discarded or blocked. More 
specifically, this paper makes the following contributions: 
 1) We develop a novel intrusion detection method based 
on the entropy changes of the CAN ID, which can be used to 
alert the CAN bus system. This method is designed to cover all 
known CAN message injection attacks. 
2) We implement the proposed IDS and validate its 
effectiveness on car data collected from a Ford Fusion internal 
CAN network. And we simulate the attacks on the CAN bus 
prototype by using the Arduino UNO microcontroller and 
CAN bus Shield.  
3) Unlike MAC based protection method that needs to 
modify the CAN messages, our entropy based IDS is a passive 
mechanism and it is independent of whether or which 
cryptographic algorithm is used. In other words, our approach 
will not modify and is applicable to any implementation of 
CAN protocols, including those modified with security 
policies such as MAC. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, 
we give the necessary backgrounds on the CAN message 
format and arbitration protocol. In Section III, we propose two 
adversary models based on the attacking capability of the 
attacker. We elaborate our entropy based IDS in Section IV 
and validate it in Section V before concluding in Section VI. 
II. BACKGROUND: CAN BUS PRELIMINARIES 
A. CAN Frame 
CAN is the most widely deployed in-vehicle 
communication protocol, which interconnects ECUs through a 
multi-master, message broadcast bus system. The involved 
ECUs communicate with each other on the CAN bus without 
the host computer to do the arbitration. The CAN frame 
contains fields such as Identifier (ID), Data Length Code 
(DLC), Data field, CRC and other control bits as shown in 
Fig.1. Since CAN is a message-oriented protocol, there are no 
transmitter or receiver addresses in the data frame. 
Nevertheless, a CAN frame contains a unique ID which 
represents the priority of the message and the function of the 
message. But without the source and target information, CAN 
messages are easily forged and difficult to be traced. 
 
Fig. 1. The format of the CAN data frame 
B. CAN Bus Arbitration 
CAN data transmission uses a bitwise arbitration method to 
decide which message could be sent on the bus when multiple 
ECUs request the bus simultaneously. The CAN specification 
defines the dominant bits (logic 0) and recessive bits (logic 1) 
based on the voltage level. If one node transmits a dominant 
bit and another node transmits a recessive bit simultaneously, 
the node with a dominant bit would win the arbitration. The 
arbitration is done in the ID field of the frame. That is to say, 
those frames with higher priority in ID would be transmitted 
before the others. And the frames with lower priority which 
fail to transmit last time would automatically attempt to re-
transmit six clocks after the end of the last message. This 
makes CAN bus system very suitable as a real-time prioritized 
communication system. 
III. ADVERSARY MODELS AND ATTACK SCENARIOS 
A. Strong and Weak Models 
Depending on the hardware, software and attack surfaces, 
ECUs would achieve different degrees of attack capabilities. 
Here, we will consider two different types of adversary 
models: strong and weak. 
For the weak adversary model, the comprised ECU can 
only send out messages with the specific ID assigned to him. 
That is to say, the weak attacker cannot arbitrary select CAN 
IDs for the malicious messages. This mechanism relies on the 
transmitter filter installed outside of the ECU to stop the 
malicious messages without valid ID sending on the CAN bus. 
To hamper the communications on the CAN bus, a weak 
attacker can only send messages with limited IDs which could 
pass the filter. However, the attacker would still fulfill his 
malicious role by sending out junk or malicious messages with 
specific IDs, if those IDs will win the bus arbitration. 
In contrast, the strong attacker could send out messages 
with any IDs. In this case, the strong attacker hampers the 
communications on CAN bus for two purposes. First, he 
would send malicious messages with higher priority IDs 
(leading zeros are in the front, e.g. 0000XXX) to override any 
periodic messages sent by a legitimate safety-critical ECU. 
Those malicious messages might be targeted to victim ECUs. 
As a result, the receiver ECU would get distracted, inoperable 
or execute errors. Second, by sending messages with higher 
priority IDs, the attacker ECU could occupy the CAN bus for a 
period of time and stop the legal ECUs sending their regular 
messages, which indeed hinders the regular operations of the 
vehicle. In other words, the adversary could maliciously stress 
the bus and compromise the usability of the other users just 
like flooding attacks. Normal flooding attacks can be easily 
detected by the network filters on the bus gateway or the 
dominant check mechanism of the CAN transceiver. However, 
the strong attack model discussed in this paper is more 
powerful than the normal flooding Denial of Service (DoS) 
attack. By holding the bus for a time, the attacker could 
simultaneously put his malicious messages on the bus which 
will cause hazardous effects to the vehicles. Thus, it is 
necessary to find out an approach to detect the attacks and stop 
it in the future transmission. The practicability of such an 
adversary model has already been proved and demonstrated in 
[9, 10]. 
B. Specific Attack Scenarios 
In the following, we will describe four specific attack 
scenarios to test the effects of our entropy based IDS. All 
presented attack scenarios are derived from those well-known 
attacks on the in-vehicle network which have been 
demonstrated in previous research publications [9, 10]. 
1) Strong Adversary Model: Flooding Message Injection 
In this scenario, the attacker has strong control of a 
compromised ECU and aims to break the availability of the 
CAN bus by sending out massive messages on the bus. This 
attack is usually deployed by injecting CAN messages 
containing the most dominant identifier, i.e. 0x00. However, 
the CAN transceivers have the detection mechanism for zero 
overloads on CAN bus. Specifically, if the transceiver sees the 
bus is occupied by 0 (high voltage), it will automatically shut 
down the transmission by pulling the high voltage to low. An 
efficient strategy for the attacker to avoid the detection 
mechanism is sending messages with changeable IDs of high 
priority. This kind of flooding attack is difficult to be detected 
by the transceivers. Furthermore, because no specific receivers 
are targeted for those malicious messages, the abnormal traffic 
would not be reported by the victim receivers. For this attack, 
the attacker can manipulate the effects of the system and the 
exposure of the detection system. The attacker can choose to 
send flooding messages with changeable IDs to overwhelm the 
regular communications. However, it will cause significant 
changes on the CAN bus, thus makes the attack easily to be 
detected. Consequently, the compromised ECU would be 
spotted because of too many junk messages, it will be shut 
down and cannot mount attacks on the CAN bus anymore.  
2) Strong Adversary Model: Message Injection with 
Single ID 
In contrast to the flooding scenario discussed above, the 
attacker could narrow down the number of IDs he uses to 
conceal himself from the detection schemes. Let us suppose 
the simplest one, the attacker would inject malicious messages 
with just a single CAN ID for two purposes: first, he wants to 
win the bus arbitration from the other low priority IDs thus 
stopping the transmission of useful messages on the bus; 
second, the malicious attacker could alter the contents of 
messages and send wrong information out with the fixed ID 
which would disturb the functions of the receiver ECUs.  
The strategy for attacker may change based on his purpose. 
If he only focuses on disturbing the CAN bus, he can 
arbitrarily select the injected ID. Otherwise, if he wants to 
achieve both, he needs to pick up the injected ID from the 
legal ID set of the vehicle. The ID of CAN bus is assigned by 
the vehicle manufacturer and only around 10% to 20% of total 
number of IDs is used. For example, for the 2016 Ford Fusion 
we tested, only 223 IDs are used, which takes 10.88 % of the 
whole ID set.  
3) Strong Adversary Model:  Messages Injection with 
Multiple IDs 
The same attack set-up as the scenario 2, but this time we 
assume that there are multiple attackers with different injected 
IDs, or the attacker can inject messages with multiple IDs. 
That is to say, the balance of entropy would be disturbed by 
two or more CAN IDs. This makes detection easier but 
inferring the faked IDs more difficult because multiple sources 
would influence the balance of the bus simultaneously.  
4) Weak Adversary Model: Messages Injection with Fixed 
ID 
In this scenario, we assume that the attacker can get the 
control of the ECU, but fail to break the transmitter filter. In 
this situation, the attacker can only transmit the malicious 
messages with fixed IDs assigned to the compromised ECU. 
Even though the control power is restricted in the weak model, 
the attacker can still break the availability of the CAN bus by 
sending out malicious messages. That happens when the ID 
assigned to that ECU are dominant the original messages 
transmitted at this time. By manipulating the frequency, the 
attacker can achieve to gain the bus control using a limited 
number of CAN IDs. 
IV.  FRAMEWORK OF ENTROPY-BASED INTRUSION 
DETECTION SYSTEM 
A. ID and Binary Entropy Definition  
The identifier (11 bits) in CAN frame represents the 
message’s priority as well as its functions, but without any 
transmitter or receiver information. One ECU could have 
multiple assigned IDs for different functionalities and several 
ECUs might be allowed to transmit the same ID, but not at the 
same time. More specifically, an ID is not unique for one ECU 
and could be consumed by different ECUs as well. Indeed, 
every packet in a vehicular CAN network and its possible data 
content are specified. The permitted value range is defined as 
well as the length of every signal and the packet function. The 
basic frame format has an 11-bit ID, whereas an extended 
format has a 29-bit ID. We will use the basic CAN ID format 
(11-bit) because it is much more prevalent, however, the 
detection method proposed in this paper is not dependent on 
the type of format, and it could also be applied to the extended 
format. In this paper, we use the probability of ‘1’ occurrence 
at each bit to represent the distribution of that bit. As defined 
in the following,  
Definition: pi is the number of messages where bit i is 1 
over the total number of messages. Notably, the range of pi is 
from [0,1]. The binary entropy function H(p) is defined as the 
entropy of a Bernoulli process with probability p. If
Pr( 1)X p  , then Pr( 0) 1X p   and the entropy of X in 
Shannon is given by 
 2 2( ) ( ) log (1 )log (1 )bX p p p p p       . 
B. Entropy Detection Scheme 
The first step is collecting data during normal driving to 
generate the golden template for detection. Because most of 
the messages on CAN bus are periodic, the distribution of 
entropy should be steady during normal driving. Data 
collected from a real Ford Fusion CAN bus demonstrate that 
assumption. The raw data from CAN are collected from 
different driving situations, e.g. turning the audio on, turning 
the light on, and driving with cruise control and so on. We 
observe that the entropy on each bit only changes slightly in 
these different testing scenarios. The variation falls in the 
range from 1e-8 to 9e-8 which is quite small. Therefore, the 
assumption as the entropy distribution under normal driving is 
steady is valid. Significant changes from the golden template 
will be treated as under attack.  
 
Fig. 2. Golden template and a case study example of an attack 
Let Ĥ={H1 H2 H3… H11} be the binary entropy vector 
measured from the real CAN data. We get the golden template 
Htemp by averaging of 35 measurements from diverse driving 
behaviors.  For each bit in Htemp, we calculate the range as 
max(Hi)-min(Hi).  And the threshold for detection can be set as 
a positive multiple of the range, expressed as Th= (max(Hi)-
min(Hi)), where   is the coefficient which determines the 
margin of the threshold. The value of    is chosen from  = 
[3,10] empirically.  For the experiment in this paper, we 
choose  =5. The golden template as an 11-bit vector is 
shown in Fig.2. In the detection procedure, we compare the 
binary entropy to the template bit by bit. If the bit change is 
above the threshold, we will treat the CAN bus is under 
intrusion attack, and the system will send an alert signal. Fig.2 
also illustrates one example of entropy changes under the 
injection attack. It is evident to find the significant changes 
occurred at some bits, e.g., Bit 6, Bit 7 and Bit 11.  
V. EVALUATION AND RESULTS 
In this section, we first discuss and define the metrics used 
to evaluate the detection system. And then we present our 
experimental results of different attack scenarios, which 
demonstrate that our entropy detection system is effective on 
all the types of attacks.  
A. Test Set-up 
For the information-theoretic measures introduced above, 
access to the vehicle network is required. In our set-up, we use 
the Vehicle Spy 3 Professional software tool to connect a 2016 
Ford Fusion internal CAN network through the OBD-II port. 
And the baud rate is set as the standard for the CAN network: 
125 kbit/s for the middle-speed CAN and 500 kbit/s for the 
high-speed CAN. We conduct our tests and experiments on the 
data acquired from the middle-speed CAN bus in this paper, 
however, our detection method would also work for high-
speed CAN bus. 
B. Injection Rate and Detection Rate 
First, we will introduce the metrics used in this paper. We 
define the injection rate Ir as the proportion of successfully 
injected messages on the bus over the total number of 
messages the malicious ECU sends to compete for the bus 
arbitration. The injection rate is relevant to the capability of 
specific ID to win the CAN bus. As the CAN bus’s arbitration 
relies on the ID priority, different IDs would win the bus 
arbitration with different probabilities. The number of times 
the attacker win the bus over the total times he tries in a fixed 
period should be a good metric to evaluate the injection power 
of the ID, which is the injection rate. Moreover, if the attacker 
wants to accomplish the attack, he needs to select the proper 
ID to win the bus arbitration first, which in turn results in 
increasing the number of injected messages overall.   
We calculate the injection rate defined above for some 
selected IDs from the CAN log data and the results are shown 
in Fig.3. From the figure, we could find out that the injection 
rate is high when the ID values are small and it will drop down 
with the value increasing. That is because CAN bus does 
arbitration on bit level and bit 0 always dominants bit 1. The 
injection rate is significant as it represents the power of the 
attacker and also highly relates to the detection rate which we 
will explain in the following.  
The detection rate Dr is defined as the proportion of 
successfully detected injected messages over the total number 
of injected. The detection rate is the proportion of malicious 
messages that are correctly identified. Obviously, the detection 
rate is highly related to the entropy changes on the CAN bus. 
And the entropy change is influenced by the number of 
injected messages. Further, the number of injected messages 
depends on three factors: the injection rate Ir of a specific ID, 
the injection frequency f and the period of time T0. Thus, the 
total number of successfully injected messages (Nm) can be 
expressed as a product shown in the formula 
Nm = Ir × f ×T0 
If the malicious attacker attempts to increase the success rate 
of injection during a fixed period of time, he should either 
choose the ID with a higher injection rate or increase the 
injection frequency. To demonstrate the relationship between 
injection rate and detection rate, we test 15 selected IDs under 
the same injection frequency. As the results are shown in 
Fig.3, the detection rate (blue line) decreases along with the 
injection rate. That is because the total number of injected 
messages on the CAN bus would decrease which makes the 
entropy changes imperceptible.  
 Fig. 3. Injection and detection rate for different CAN ID 
C. Inferring Malicious IDs  
Generally saying, our Intrusion Detection System has two 
main tasks: 1) Detect the changes and demonstrate the 
evidence of the attack; 2) Figure out the injected message IDs 
and alert to the system for those malicious IDs. Here, we will 
discuss how to infer the malicious IDs based on the changes of 
the entropy observed on CAN bus.  
For example, if the bit entropy changes in the negative 
direction (from 1 to 0), we can infer that the corresponding bit 
of the injected ID will be probably 0. Then, we can select 
those IDs in the ID pool with that bit is 0. When conducting 
this selection procedure bit by bit, the candidates’ space will 
narrow down by combining the observing changes. However, 
this inference is non-deterministic as we have no clues on the 
other unchanged bit, which could be either 0 or 1. As a result, 
we propose the rank selection method to evaluate the accuracy 
in searching the malicious IDs. The procedure works as 
follows, we select the first n rank candidates which obey the 
constraints derived from the entropy changes. If the malicious 
ID is in the candidate set, we will mark this detection as a hit. 
We use the hit rate to evaluate the accuracy of inferring. Due 
to the arbitration rule in CAN bus, the ID would be more 
powerful in injection if the most significant bits are 0. As a 
result, we sort the IDs in numeral ascending order, which 
means the preceding IDs in the sorted list would have a higher 
probability to be the malicious ID. The results of inferring 
accuracy for different attack scenarios are shown in Table I. 
And for the inference in our experiment, we set rank=10, 
which indicates each time we select the first 10 IDs as the 
candidates. 
D. Results Analysis of Different Attack Scenarios 
We evaluate the feasibility of the proposed Intrusion 
Detection System on the four attack scenarios discussed 
above. First, we evaluate the detection rate of different 
scenarios to verify the accuracy and efficiency, and then we 
discuss on the inferring rate for the malicious ID under 
different attack scenarios.  
The four test scenarios are listed as the flooding injection 
(FI), single message injection (SI), multiple messages 
injection(MI), and restricted ID message injection in weak 
mode (WI) with different injection frequencies(i.e., 100Hz, 
50Hz, 20Hz and 10Hz).  The detection rates for different 
scenarios are summarized in Table I.  
In the flooding attack scenario, the attacker sends out many 
faked messages on the bus. It would cause dramatic entropy 
changes and this attack could be detected quickly. However, as 
the attacker arbitrary chooses the injected IDs without clear 
preference, it is infeasible to infer the injected IDs based on 
the almost randomly changed entropy.  But if the attacker 
keeps sending flooding messages with different IDs, it will be 
easily detected by the filter in the gateway. Besides, it will leak 
some side-channel information to the internal detection sensor 
of this system as it is mounted on the bus for such a long 
period of time. For example, the power consumption and the 
requests for communication will be distinct for this 
compromised ECU.  
For the single message injection, the attacker injected 
messages with one specific ID to influence the function of the 
target ECU. First of all, this injection would cause entropy 
changes on the CAN bus and our intrusion system would have 
on average 91% rate to detect this attack. Note this result is the 
average on every test CAN IDs including those with lower 
injection rate. For those CAN IDs with a higher injection rate, 
the detection rate could be as high as 100%. In this scenario, it 
is easier to infer the malicious ID based on the entropy 
changes, so the inferring accuracy is as high as 97.2%.  
Then, we test and evaluate for multiple ID injections. In 
this case, messages with multiple CAN IDs are injected into 
the CAN bus causing complex changes than a single message 
injection. The basic approach to detect the multiple injection 
messages starts with inferring the ID based on a combination 
of the entropy changes. To achieve the purpose, we need to 
analyze not only the change direction but also the changing 
rate of each bit. We modify the selection algorithm to derive 
new constraints. Compared with the results for the single 
injection, the average detection rate is higher because multiple 
IDs are used with the increasing of the injection rate. 
However, the accuracy of inferring malicious IDs decreases 
when having multiple injected IDs. That is reasonable as the 
disturbance of multiple sources makes the algorithm difficult 
to select the exact combination of malicious IDs. Moreover, 
we test the multiple injection attacks with 2, 3 and 4 injected 
IDs respectively and the injection rate keeps going up as we 
enlarge the number of IDs while the inference accuracy goes 
down because of the disturbance of multiple IDs. As we 
mentioned above, the multiple ID injections are restricted by 
the filter and in real applications, it is challengeable for the 
attacker to have a fully-compromised ECU on the CAN bus. 
With 4 and more injection IDs, the compromised ECU would 
be easily figured out by the gateway filter. 
 We also complete the same test on the weak adversary 
model, which the attacker is restricted by the sender filter.  The 
attacker can only send the messages with the ID assigned to 
him. The detection result is same as the single message 
injection, however, the inferring accuracy is a bit lower than 
the single ID injection, because the attacker is not restricted to 
inject single ID on the bus, and he can manipulatively change 
the entropy by using multiple IDs he could legally send.  
From the results discussed above, we conclude that the detection rates are all above 90% for all the scenarios. And the 
inferring accuracies for several scenarios are above 90% as 
well. With our golden entropy model, we are able to 
successfully detect almost all the attacks (the 2nd column in 
Table I) and locate the malicious message ID except the 
flooding attack (the 3rd column in Table 1).  
TABLE I.  EVALUATION RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT ATTACKS 
Attack scenarios Detection rate Inferring accuracy 
Flood 100% -- 
Single Injection 91% 97.2% 
Multiple_Injection_2 97% 91.8% 
Multiple_Injection_3 97.2% 88.5% 
Multiple_Injection_4 99.97% 69.7% 
Weak Injection 93% 96.6% 
E. Advantages of the Proposed Approach 
Lots of IDS have been discussed so far to protect the CAN 
bus communications [8,11]. We will compare our method with 
two representatives IDSs in this section.  
In [8], the authors proposed an entropy-based approach for 
intrusion detection. However, their approach studies on the 
entropy changes of the whole message and treat the 11-bit ID 
as an inseparable vector. In our work, we split the 11-bit ID 
vector and analyze the entropy change bit by bit. Our method 
has several advantages over the approach in [8]. First, we 
could take use of the changes on the bit level to infer the 
malicious ID which is not implemented in their approach. 
Because the most significant bit has higher priority and much 
more influence on the arbitration, we will first focus on the 
higher priority bit. Besides, our bit-level entropy calculation 
would achieve a relative saving in the computing the entropy 
(from hundreds of elements down to 11) which is a benefit for 
the real react system for vehicles. The IDS for network 
security in vehicles always requires a light-weight detection 
algorithm because of the limitation of the computing power of 
electronic devices in cars. In [8], they need to count and store 
the occurrence of every ID on the CAN-bus for a relatively 
long period of time to determine the injection. Our system is 
designed to react quickly in a time period of as short as 1s due 
to the saving in the calculation. Besides, each ID in the set 
would require a memory space, which is not a negligible cost 
as the growing ID numbers in the network, especially for the 
constrict resources in the embedded system. However, in our 
bit-slice method, we just need 11 memory spaces to store the 
counting results for each bit, no matter how many ID messages 
are on the bus.  
 In [11], the authors built an Intrusion Detection System 
based on the analysis of time intervals of CAN messages. 
Compared to their method, our entropy-based method also 
supers as the cost-effective storage. In the time interval based 
detection method, they need to monitor the changes of the 
period for all the signals transmitting on the bus. As we stated 
before, each ID needs a specific storage space for the past and 
current period, thus introducing linear storage consumption.  
In addition, their method only records the period changes of 
specific ID, it cannot figure out such an attack scenario when 
the attacker uses unseen ID.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
We have developed a bit entropy based intrusion detection 
system which is a lightweight and nonintrusive security 
framework that can protect CAN bus without modifying its 
protocols and implementation. Our system is capable of 
restricting attackers from injecting a large number of malicious 
messages with higher priority IDs, as well as finding out the 
malicious IDs. These claims are supported by data collected 
from a running vehicle and simulated attacks. 
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